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Abstract
This paper addresses two hot topics of the contemporary debate, social
capital and economic growth. Our theoretical analysis sheds light on de-
cisive but so far neglected issues: how does social capital accumulate over
time? Which is the relationship between social capital, technical progress
and economic growth in the long run?
The analysis shows that the economy may be attracted by alternative
steady states, depending on the initial social capital endowments and cul-
tural exogenous parameters representing the relevance of social interaction
and trust in well-being and production.
When material consumption and relational goods are substitutable, the
choice to devote more and more time to private activities may lead the
economy to a “social poverty trap”, where the cooling of human relations
causes a progressive destruction of the entire stock of social capital. In
this case, the relationship of social capital with technical progress is de-
scribed by an inverted U-shaped curve. However, the possibility exists for
the economy to follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social cap-
ital endogenously and unboundedly grows. Such result may follow from
a range of particular conditions, under which the economy behaves as if
there was no substitutability between relational activities and material
consumption.
1 Introduction
The positive role of social capital in growth and development is one of the most
popular and controversial theses standing in the contemporary economic de-
bate. Even if theoretical and empirical research have produced a huge amount
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1of papers on the topic, the literature still suﬀers from a range of structural
problems. First, economic studies generally focus on the possible eﬀects of so-
cial capital on a range of supposed outcomes, with a strong attention to the
concept of growth. The reverse eﬀect of growth on social capital is generally ne-
glected, and we lack a micro-founded theory explaining the relationship between
these variables. Many authors suggest that, to be sustainable in the long run,
growth must preserve (or improve) well-being and social cohesion (Rodrik, 1999,
Bartolini and Bonatti, 2002 and 2003, Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock, 2003).
Extending this argument, one could argue that growth is desirable as long as
it does not erode the stock of social capital of the economy. Second, there is
a lack of studies addressing the sources of social capital. While the dominant
view in sociology is that social capital incidentally accumulates as a by-product
of diverse relational activities (Coleman, 1990), economic studies are basically
tied down to Becker’s (1974) theory of social interaction, that treats human
relationships as an individual resource to be exploited within the pursuit of the
agents’ personal interests. As a result, the mechanism through which social
capital is created and accumulated remains quite mysterious and unclear.
This paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on two fundamental
questions: how does social capital accumulate over time? Which are the short
and long-run dynamics of social capital’s interaction with economic growth?
To reach this goal, we develop a dynamic model where social capital enters
as an argument in the agents’ utility functions and as an input in both “ma-
terial” and “relational” goods’ production functions. The assumption we draw
from previous research in the ﬁeld is that an increase in trust-based relations
may reduce the average cost of transactions, just as an increase in physical cap-
ital reduces the average cost of production (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000, Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2004, Antoci, Sacco and Vanin, 2007, Bartolini and Bon-
atti, 2008). Relational goods are a distinctive type of good that can only be
enjoyed if shared with others. They are diﬀerent from private goods, which are
enjoyed alone, and standard public goods, which can be enjoyed by any number
(Uhlaner, 1989). A peculiarity of relational goods is that it is virtually impos-
sible to separate their production from consumption, since they easily coincide.
Social capital is deﬁned as the sum of networks of trust-intensive relations that
the agents develop through the simultaneous production and consumption of
relational goods.
Agents allocate their time between labour, aimed at the production of pri-
vate goods, and social participation activities, which generate social capital as
a by-product. Since on the job relations may stimulate the creation of durable
social ties, we consider the possibility of positive spillovers from “private” to
“relational” production. However, a negative workplace climate and/or a poor
social environment, oﬀering scarce options for socially enjoyed leisure, may dis-
courage interaction. In order to account for the possible cooling of relationships,
a positive social capital’s depreciation rate is included in the model.
In the analysis of the agents’ time allocation choices, we address the possi-
bility of substitution between private consumption and relational goods. When
there is no substitutability, social participation is positive and constant at a
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the process of production and accumulation of social capital more vulnerable:
relational activities in fact entail the participation of other people, the need to
engage intensively for long periods, and immediate costs in terms of time and
eﬀort (Bruni and Stanca, 2008). An environment poor of participation oppor-
tunities raises such costs causing uneasiness and frustration. As a consequence,
people may defend themselves by substituting social participation with private
activities like watching TV, which provides virtual relationships and interactions
(Antoci, Sacco and Vanin, 2001, Bruni and Stanca, 2008).
Our model shows that, if social capital is more relevant in the production
of relational goods, then social participation is equal to zero (or positive) when
the initial stock of social capital is below (over) a certain threshold. Vice versa,
if social capital plays a major role in private production, we have positive (or
null) social participation when the initial endowments of social capital are be-
low (over) the critical threshold. Along any trajectories, social capital always
exhibits a monotonic trend.
The analysis of long-run dynamics shows that the economy may be attracted
by alternative steady states, depending on the initial social capital endowments
and cultural exogenous parameters representing the relevance of social interac-
tion and trust in well-being and production.
When private consumption and relational goods are substitutable, the choice
to devote more and more time to private activities may lead the economy to a
“social poverty trap”, where the cooling of human relations causes a progressive
destruction of the entire stock of social capital.
Introducing exogenous technical progress in the production function of pri-
vate goods entails interesting modiﬁcations in social capital’s accumulation dy-
namics. Under the assumption of no substitutability between private and rela-
tional goods, the stock of social capital can grow indeﬁnitely along any trajectory
or alternatively tend to zero according to the value of the model’s parameters.
Its trend relative to technical progress can be monotonic (always increasing or
decreasing) or can experience an initial decline followed by a growth, but not
vice versa (a growth followed by a decline is impossible).
When there is positive substitutability, two cases are possible: a) under
certain conditions, the stock of social capital may always tend to zero indepen-
dently of its initial endowments. In this case, social capital experiences a growth
followed by a decline, so that its relationship with technical progress is described
by an inverted U-shaped curve. Since technical progress is in turn positively
correlated with GNP, this result sounds as a proof of Putnam’s (2000) intuition
about the inverted U-shaped relationship between social capital and growth)
Otherwise, if the initial endowments are high enough, there are trajectories
along which social capital can grow indeﬁnitely.
In other words, if private and relational goods are substitutable, fast eco-
nomic growth exerts a pressure on the agents’ time allocation choices which
grows with the advancement of technical progress, thereby promoting private-
oriented activities at the expenses of social participation. This result is partic-
ularly interesting in the light of the recent explosion of new highly technology-
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subrogating social interactions. For example, meeting on Facebook is in most
cases an artiﬁcial and illusory activity, which still often becomes a substitute
for actual human relationships.
In the long run, such mechanism bridles the economic growth itself, because
the loss of productivity in the private sector caused by the decline of social
participation may not be balanced by the joint rise of time devoted to labour
and private consumption.
The possibility of taking trajectories characterized by an unbounded growth
of social capital depends on its initial endowments: a social environment rich of
participation opportunities and a culture acknowledging the importance of non
market relations certainly constitute a good, desirable “starting point”.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two illustrates how social
capital may improve the agents’ well-being. Section three brieﬂy reviews the
literature on the relationship between social capital and economic growth. Sec-
tions four and ﬁve present the model and analyze its dynamics. Section six
studies the eﬀect of exogenous technical progress on social capital’s dynamics.
The paper is closed by a discussion of results and policy implications.
2 Social capital and well-being
Human relations matter for people’s happiness and well-being. Such a statement
sounds so obvious that most of the people would be surprised to know that the
analysis of social interactions is quite a novelty in the contemporary economic
debate. What economists have long questioned is whether the social sphere of
individuals can inﬂuence their economic action. The ﬁrst answers we can ﬁnd in
the economic literature are deﬁnitely positive. In the Lectures on Jurisprudence,
Smith states: “A dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in
performing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in
a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbors, as
the very appearance of a cheat would make him lose. Where people seldom deal
with one another, we ﬁnd that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because
they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury which it
does their character.” (1763/1978, 539).
Smith’s argument basically refers to trading relationships, but it can be
easily generalized to every kind of interaction. A social environment rich of par-
ticipation opportunities, which allow people to meet frequently, creates a fertile
ground for nurturing trust and shared values. The higher likelihood of repeated
interactions increases the opportunity cost of free-riding in prisoners dilemma
kind of situations, thereby making the agents behaviour more foreseeable and
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. In other words, social interactions
are a vehicle for the diﬀusion of information and trust which inevitably aﬀect
the economic activity, so that the two spheres of individual action continuously
fade one another. Such claims more or less explicitly ground most of the contem-
porary social capital research in economics. Smith’s view is similar to modern
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gues that social ties work as bridges through which information and trust spread
across diverse communities and socioeconomic backgrounds. On the other side,
the value of reputation and social approval is considered by Smith one of the
main engines of human action. The importance of social approval is further
stressed by Bentham (1789), who makes a step forward by mentioning 15 “ba-
sic wants” grounding the economic action. Among them, the author lists the
pleasures of being on good terms with others, the pleasures of a good name,
the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasure supposed to be possessed
by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence, and the pleasures result-
ing from the view of any pain supposed to be suﬀered by the beings who may
become the objects of malevolence. The agents described by classical econo-
mists are thus deeply rooted in the social context, and their economic activities
strictly depend on the complex of norms and relationships surrounding them.
Personal relations and structures (or networks) of such relations seem to be cru-
cial in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. This is the same claim
advanced by Granovetter (1985) in his essay on the embeddedness of the eco-
nomic action. Paradoxically, this work stems from a critique to both classical
and neoclassical economics, which, according to the author, have in common
an undersocialized view of actors. While it is commonly acknowledged that, in
the work of Marx and Ricardo, economic actors are deeply socialized, a relevant
number of authors ﬁnd traces of the typical codewords pervading the social cap-
ital literature (e.g. trust, norms, values, altruism, sympathy, and so on) in the
work of Smith as well (Becker, 1981, Bruni, 2000, Fontaine, 2000).
According to Manski (2000), the narrowing of economics ended by the 1970s:
“Since then a new phase has been underway, in which the discipline seeks to
broaden its scope while maintaining the rigor that has become emblematic of
economic analysis” (2000, 115). The work of Becker (1974) is probably the most
notable contribution to the economic analysis of social interaction. In his essay,
the author adopts the neoclassical framework “To analyze interactions between
the behaviour of some persons and diﬀerent characteristics of other persons”
(1974, 1063). Becker recalls Bentham’s concept of “basic wants” to state that
the agents’ well-being - and their behaviour as well - depend on the satisfaction
of a range of fundamental needs, labelled as commodities:
Ui = Ui (Z1,...Zm)
Each commodity Zj (J = 1,...,m) is produced through a technology based
on market goods and services xj,time tj,education, experience and environmen-
tal variables Ei,and the characteristics of other persons which may aﬀect the
production of the speciﬁc j commodity, R1
j,...,Rr
j. (Becker, 1974). In other
words, Rj represent the inﬂuence of social interaction on the satisfaction of the
basic needs given by Z commodities. The author gives the example of the Z1
need of i to stand out in his occupation. In this case, R1
1,...,Rr
1 could be the
opinions of i held by other persons in the same occupation. In the same way, if
Z2 is the need to have a good job, R1
2,...,Rr
2 could be the social contacts helping
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make an impression on his neighbors, their opinions R1
3,...,Rr
3 are complemen-
tary to market goods like an expensive car or elegant clothes in the production
of Z3.
In this way, social interactions are crucial for fulﬁlling the material needs of
life as well as market goods inﬂuence the social sphere of agents. Generalizing
the deﬁnition of relational goods provided in section 1 to include every interac-
tion not directly leading to a market exchange, we could state that, in Becker’s
model, relational goods enter as arguments in the individuals’ production func-
tion of certain material goods (which are ﬁnally provided through transactions),
as well as market goods enter in the production function of relational ones (pro-
vided through social interaction). The implicit novelty (in respect to previous
neoclassical theory) is that i can change R1
j,...,Rr
j by his own eﬀort (e.g. work-
ing hard to earn his colleagues’ respect, expanding his social network to raise
the likelihood to get a good job, and so on). In such a framework, assuming to
the seek of simplicity only one single commodity produced with a single good,
the agent’s problem is as follows:



MaxUi(x,R)
R = Di + h
pxx + prh = Ii
where h measures the eﬀect of i’s eﬀort, Di is the level of R when i makes
not eﬀort, Ii is his money income, and prh is the money amount which must be
spent to inﬂuence R.
Inﬂuences and relations R1
j,...,Rr
j shaping the social sphere of the individual
are a means for the pursuit of his personal interest: they can be considered as
Becker’s social capital. This theory has been decisively inﬂuential in the fol-
lowing literature in the ﬁeld, but also received wide criticism. We do not want
to get the hearth of the debate on the neoclassical approach to social interac-
tion, which has led some authors, and Becker himself, to talk about “economics
imperialism”. In this context, we just would like to point out that the social
capital described by the author is a private good, i.e. an individual resource to
be exploited by single agents to the purposes of utility maximization. This view
is in part consistent with the early thesis of Banﬁeld (1958). In the Moral Basis
of a Backward Society, the author explains the backwardness of Southern Italy
through the “amoral familism” of its inhabitants, who would not cooperate with
one another outside the boundaries of their immediate families. According to
the author, in the Italian Mezzogiorno any family activity was oriented towards
the protection and consolidation of the isolated family unit. “Moral” activity
(i.e. any action informed by moral norms of trust and reciprocity) was seen as
limited to family insiders, with outsiders only being signiﬁcant as a potential
resource to exploit for the family.
Both Becker and Banﬁeld do not explicitly mention the concept of social
capital; still, their view of social interaction is commonly considered as an an-
ticipation of the contemporary literature on the topic. The social capital of the
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ers to be “activated”. Its accumulation is a consequence of rational investment
decisions which take place solely at the individual level, since agents’ ties do
not add up to create a “public” stock possibly beneﬁting the community as a
whole.
Such position is in sharp contrast with the approaches proposed by the
sociological and political science literature, where social capital is treated as a
collective resource or, in other terms, as a public good (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986,
Coleman,1988, 1990, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993).
The model presented in section 4 aims to implement the hints coming from
modern sociology into a traditional framework of analysis. The creation of so-
cial capital does not depend on agents’ rational investment decisions. Rather,
it is a by-product of social participation activities related to the production and
consumption of relational goods. The stock resulting from its accumulation is a
collective resource, which aﬀects the well-being of each individual by contribut-
ing to the production of both private and relational goods. In section 5 we will
show how the impossibility to internalize the positive externalities of participa-
tion may lead to a systematic underinvestment in social capital progressively
eroding its stock, and plunging the economy into a situation of social poverty.
3 Social capital and growth
In the recent debate, the public good features of social capital are now com-
monly acknowledged. It is possible to argue that the functioning of the economy
itself relies on those institutions (whether formal or informal) that the literature
often groups together under the common label of social capital (e.g. norms of
trust and reciprocity, moral sanctions, networks of relationships, and organi-
zations). If that is the case, then the economy’s possibility of “reproducing”
itself, thereby experiencing sustainable growth, depends also on its ability to
foster - or, at least, to preserve - its endowments of social capital. On this ba-
sis, the idea is spreading that a better understanding of the role of norms and
relationships would be a crucial step for the advancement of modern political
economy. In the last two decades, such idea has informed the development of
a huge number of empirical studies, exploring the eﬀect of social capital on an
immense range of phenomena, from political participation to the institutional
performance, from health to corruption, from the eﬃciency of public services to
the economic success of countries. The seminal study in the ﬁeld is the so-called
“Italian work” by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), which explains the
diﬀerent institutional and economic performance of the Italian regions as the
result of the inﬂuence exerted by some aspects of the social structure, summa-
rized into the multidimensional concept of “social capital”. Just like Becker’s
work, this study received wide criticism in the social science debate of the 1990s.
However, it posed a milestone for social capital theory, which registered an ex-
plosive development in the following decade, rapidly involving the attention of
economists. Empirical research in economics has been prompted by a couple of
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and civic norms are unrelated to horizontal networks and have a strong impact
on economic performance in a sample of 29 market economies. La Porta et al
(1997) show that ﬁrms’ scale is strongly related to trust in strangers (positively),
and trust in family (negatively).
We do not want to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical
research here (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, and Sabatini, 2007, for exhaus-
tive reviews). To our purposes, it is important to point out that this strand of
the literature unanimously converges on the claim that one of the mechanisms
through which social capital impacts economic eﬃciency is by enhancing the
level of trust and reducing uncertainty. As anticipated in the previous section,
the basic idea is that a social environment rich of participation opportunities is
a fertile ground for nurturing trust and shared values, where repeated interac-
tions foster the diﬀusion of information and raise reputations’ relevance. The
higher opportunity cost of free-riding in prisoners’ dilemma kind of situations
makes the agents’ behaviour more foreseeable causing an overall reduction of
uncertainty. Therefore, an increase in trust-based relations reduce monitoring
costs and, more in general, the average cost of transactions. Our model accounts
for these claims through the assumption that social capital enters as an input
in the production of private goods.
The direction of the nexus connecting social capital to development is an-
other subject of contention in the empirical literature. Even if most studies
agree on the positive role of networks and trust, we have few evidence on the
reverse eﬀect possibly played by growth and development on the accumulation
of social capital.
On this regard, two diﬀerent interpretations can be suggested.
On the one side, higher levels of wealth and development may reinforce social
participation and the development of shared norms of trust and reciprocity. For
example, the mutual assistance mechanisms developed within the family unit,
which Banﬁeld referred to as a result of the “amoral familism”, could be looked
on also as a defence reaction against situations of underdevelopment and social
poverty, where both the state’s and market’s institutions are weak. In a pio-
neer study, Bilson (1982) shows that civil liberties are strongly associated with
per capita income (and positively but not signiﬁcantly related to recent income
growth). The author’s interpretation is that economic performance determines
freedoms, rather than the other way around. More recently, Sabatini (2008)
ﬁnds that in the Italian regions strong family ties are reinforced by backward-
ness and lower levels of income, while the strength of bridging ties related to
voluntary organizations is signiﬁcantly and positively associated to higher levels
of human development.
On the other side, it is possible to argue that the pressure exerted on time
by economic growth may act as a factor hampering the consolidation of social
ties, thereby leading to an erosion of the social capital’s stock. As everyday life
experience suggests, time constraints are ever more pressing in modern societies.
A historical symptom of the higher opportunity cost of time is the rise of female
participation to the labour market, which Putnam (2000) indicates as one of
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seller Bowling Alone, the author shows that several indexes of civic engagement
and social capital exhibit an inverted U-shaped trend over time in the United
States. Costa and Kahn (2003) conﬁrm that being in the labour force is a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, negative predictor of membership in organizations, as well
as of the probability of visiting friends and entertaining at home. Once again,
causality is a major problem: drawing on GSS data, Bartolini and Bilancini
(2007) point out the relevance of the reverse eﬀect, ﬁnding evidence that social,
“non-instrumental”, interactions reduce labour supply, with a greater impact
on women.
At the theoretical level, the negative externalities of growth have been quite
neglected by the literature. Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) show that the
technological change and innovation generally associated to growth inﬂuence
social capital by rising labour mobility: higher levels of turnover may hamper
the consolidation of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace. More-
over, we can argue that the uncertainty of future incomes related to increased
mobility aﬀects any form of long-term planning of life activities such as mar-
riage and procreation. Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2007) show that the expansion
of market activities implies a growing pressure on time, which compresses the
social sphere of individuals. As a consequence, the process of economic growth
may be accompanied by a progressive “social impoverishment” of the economy.
As the authors state, an early account of this process is given by Hirsch (1976):
“As the subjective cost of time rises, pressure for speciﬁc balancing of personal
advantage in social relationships will increase. ... Perception of the time spent
in social relationships as a cost is itself a product of privatized aﬄuence. The
eﬀect is to whittle down the amount of friendship and social contact ... . The
huge increase in personal mobility in modern economies adds to the problem by
making sociability more of a public and less of a private good. The more people
move, the lower are the chances of social contacts being reciprocated directly
on a bilateral basis” (p.80).
The model in section four addresses all the hypotheses described above:
agents chose how to allocate their time between labour, aimed at the produc-
tion of private goods, and social participation activities, that generate social
capital as a by-product. In section ﬁve we analyze the long-run dynamics of
the interaction between growth and the accumulation of social capital, showing
that the economy may fall in a social poverty trap depending on the initial
social capital endowments and cultural exogenous parameters representing the
relevance of social interaction and trust in well-being and production. The ef-
fects of exogenous technical progress on social capital’s dynamics are analyzed
in section six.
4 The model
In the light of the arguments discussed above, the notion of social capital taken
into account within our framework is deﬁned as the sum of networks of trust-
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and consumption of relational goods. The accumulation of social capital is
highly path-dependent: on the one side, it improves the technology of production
of relational goods; on the other side greater social participation taking the
form of higher levels of relational goods’ production and consumption fosters
the consolidation of ties and trust among people, thereby increasing the stock
of social capital as a by-product. Of course we cannot exclude the possibility
that agents engage in social activities for instrumental purposes (for example,
to achieve a better job). However, following hints from rational choice sociology
(Coleman, 1990), we assume that most of the times the creation of interpersonal
ties does not depend on rational investment decisions. Rather, it is an incidental,
not necessary, by-product of social participation. The resulting stock is a public
resource, which enters as an argument in every agent’s utility function due of
its ability to contribute to the production of both private and relational goods.
We consider a population of size 1 constituted by a continuum of individuals.
We assume that, in each instant of time t, the well-being of the individual
i ∈ [0,1] depends on the consumption of two goods: a private good, Ci(t), and
a socially provided good, Bi(t). We assume that Bi(t) is produced by the joint
action of the time devoted by agent i to social activities, si(t), by the average
social participation s(t) =
  1
0 si(t)di and by the stock of social capital Ks(t):
Bi(t) = F(si(t),s(t),Ks(t)) (1)
The time agent i does not spend for social participation, 1−si(t), is used as
input in the production of the output Yi(t) of the private good. As suggested by
Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2008), we assume that social capital plays also
a role in the production process of the private good. In addition, for simplicity,
we assume that Ci(t) = Yi(t), that is Yi(t) cannot be accumulated, and that the
production process of Yi(t) requires only the input 1 − si(t) and Ks(t):
Ci(t) = Yi(t) = G(1 − si(t),Ks(t)) (2)
The functions F and G in (1) and (2) are assumed to be strictly increasing
in each argument Note that, in such context, 1 − si(t) can be interpreted as
the time spent both to produce and to consume Ci(t).
As in Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2007, 2008), social capital is not accu-
mulated through speciﬁc investment decisions but as a by-product of social par-
ticipation. In addition, since job interactions and the consumption of some kinds
of private goods may stimulate durable social interactions, we assume also a pos-
itive spillover on social capital accumulation due to the production/consumption
of the private good:
˙ Ks(t) = H
 
B(t),Y (t)
 
− ηKs(t) (3)
where ˙ Ks(t) indicates the time derivative of Ks(t), the parameter η > 0
represents the depreciation rate of Ks(t), B(t) =
  1
0 Bi(t)di and Y (t) = C(t) =
10  1
0 Yi(t)di are the average production/consumption of the socially provided good
and the average production/consumption of the private good, respectively.
For simplicity, we consider the following speciﬁcations for (1),(2),(3):
Yi(t) = [1 − si(t)]   Kα
s (t)
Bi(t) = sε(t)   s1−ε
i (t)   Kγ
s(t)
˙ Ks(t) =
 
Y (t)
 β
 
 
B(t)
 δ
− ηKs(t) (4)
with ε ∈ (0,1), and α,β,γ,δ > 0.
Note that a positive average social participation s(t) > 0 is essential for
the production/consumption of Bi(t), that is Bi(t) = 0 if s(t) = 0 whatever
the values of si(t) and Ks(t) are. If γ > α, then the role of social capital is
more relevant in the production/consumption of relational goods than in the
production/consumption of private goods.
According to (4), B(t) and Y (t) are both essential factors for social capital
accumulation, that is the stock of social capital Ks(t) decreases (that is ˙ Ks(t) <
0) if B(t) = 0 or Y (t) = 0.
Finally, we assume that the instantaneous utility function of individual i is:
Ui [Ci(t),Bi(t)] = lnCi(t) + bln[Bi(t) + d   Ci(t)] (5)
where b > 0 and d ≥ 0 are parameters. Notice that, according to this
function, the private good can satisfy needs diﬀerent from those satisﬁed by
Bi(t) (the part lnCi(t) in the utility function); however, it can also be consumed
as a substitute for Bi(t) (the part ln[Bi(t) + d   Ci(t)] in the utility function).
The parameter d measures the degree of substitutability between Bi(t) and
Ci(t); if d = 0, then there is no substitutability between the two goods. Note
that, if d > 0, the mixed partial derivative of Ui with respect to Ci(t) and Bi(t)
is strictly negative:
∂2Ui
∂Ci∂Bi
= −
bd
(dCi + Bi)
2 < 0
This means that the lower the value of Bi(t) is, the greater the marginal utility
of private consumption Ci(t) will be. Finally, the parameter b in (5) measures
the relative importance of the consumption of the socially provided good with
respect to that of the private good.
Letting r the discounting rate of future utility, the i−agent’s maximization
problem is:
max
si(t)
  +∞
0
{lnCi(t) + bln[Bi(t) + d   Ci(t)]}e−rtdt (6)
subject to the dynamic constraint (4). The agent i solves problem (6) taking
as exogenously given the value of Ks(t) and average values s(t), B(t) and Y (t);
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values, being economic agents a continuum. As a consequence, by applying the
Maximum Principle to problem (6) we obtain that the choices of individual i
don’t depend on the co-state variable associated to Ks(t) (that is the “price”
of Ks(t)) in the maximization problem (6). Consequently, to solve problem (6),
agent i, in each instant t, chooses the value of si(t) maximizing the value of
the instantaneous utility function (5). This implies that the dynamics of Ks(t)
we study do not represent the social optimum. However, since agent i plays
the best response si(t), given the others’ choices, the trajectories followed by
Ks(t) represent Nash equilibria. In fact, along these trajectories, no agent has
incentive to modify his choices if the other agents do not revise their ones as
well.
To simplify our analysis, in this paper we focus on symmetric Nash equi-
libria. In particular, we assume that individuals are identical and make the
same choices. This assumption allows us to study the choices of a representative
agent; so we can omit the subscript i in the variables si(t), Bi(t), Yi(t) and Ci(t)
writing simply s(t), B(t), Y (t) and C(t). In this symmetric Nash equilibrium
context, we have that ex ante average values s(t), B(t) and Y (t) are considered
as exogenously given by the representative agent; however, once chosen s(t), ex
post it holds:
s(t) = s(t)
B(t) = sε(t)   s1−ε(t)   Kγ
s (t) = s(t)   Kγ
s (t) = s(t)   Kγ
s(t)
Y (t) = [1 − s(t)]   Kα
s (t) = [1 − s(t)]   Kα
s (t)
In this context, the representative agent, in each instant of time t, chooses
s(t) solving the following static optimization problem:
max
s
 
ln[(1 − s)   Kα
s ] + bln
 
sεs1−εKγ
s + d   (1 − s)   Kα
s
  
(7)
taking as exogenously given the values of s and Ks. The solution s(t) of the
problem (7) has to be substituted to s(t) in the equation (4) which, under our
symmetric Nash equilibria assumption, can be written as follows:
˙ Ks(t) =
 
Y (t)
 β
 
 
B(t)
 δ
− ηKs(t) =
= [[1 − s(t)]   Kα
s (t)]
β  
 
sε(t)   s1−ε(t)   Kγ
s(t)
 δ
− ηKs(t) =
= [1 − s(t)]
β [s(t)]
δ   Kαβ+γδ
s (t) − ηKs(t) (8)
Where β and δ are strictly positive parameters. Note that under dynamics
(8), social capital accumulation is negative if s(t) = 0 (no social participation)
or if s(t) = 1 (the production/consumption of the private good is equal to zero).
12Remark: According to (8), the value of s(t) that, given Ks(t), maximizes the
rate of growth of Ks(t) is:
s(t)=s
g:=
δ
β + δ
The latest expression can be interpreted as the “golden rule” for the accu-
mulation of social capital. Note that sg → 0 if δ → 0, and sg → 1 when the
value of β is negligible relative to that of δ.
5 Analysis of the model
5.1 The time allocation choice
For simplicity, we limit our analysis to “robust” cases only, that is those not cor-
responding to equality conditions on parameters’ values. The following propo-
sition concerns the choice of s(t) by the representative agent (due to space
constraints, propositions’ proofs are omitted if straightforward).
Proposition 1 Problem (7) admits solution and the time allocation choice s∗(t)
of the representative agent is:
1. if γ − α > 0
s∗(t) =

 
 
0, if Ks(t) ≤
 
d(b+1)
bε
  1
γ−α
bεKγ−α
s (t)−d(b+1)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s (t)−d(b+1), if Ks(t) >
 
d(b+1)
bε
  1
γ−α (9)
2. if γ − α < 0
s∗(t) =

 
 
bεKγ−α
s (t)−d(b+1)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s (t)−d(b+1), if Ks(t) ≤
 
d(b+1)
bε+1
  1
γ−α
0, if Ks(t) >
 
d(b+1)
bε+1
  1
γ−α (10)
The intuition behind the results of this proposition is simple. In our model,
social capital produces contrasting pressures on the representative agent’s time
allocation choices. If γ − α > 0 (remember that γ and α are the exponents of
Ks in the production functions of B(t) and Y (t), respectively), then (ceteris
paribus) an increase of the stock of social capital Ks has the eﬀect to increase
the productivity of time spent for social participation s(t) relative to that of
time spent in the production and consumption of the private good. Vice versa
if γ − α < 0. Therefore, when γ − α > 0, we have s(t) = 0 (respectively,
s(t) > 0) for “low” (respectively, “high”) values of the stock of social capital
Ks. Viceversa if γ − α < 0. An implication of such result is that, according to
equation (4), the stock of social capital cannot grow indeﬁnitely when γ−α < 0
while this may be the case when γ − α > 0.
13Notice that if there is no substitutability between private consumption C
and the socially provided good B, that is d = 0 in (5), it holds d(b + 1) = 0;
therefore
 
d(b+1)
bε
  1
γ−α
= 0 if γ − α > 0. In such context that, by (9)-(10), the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption d = 0, problem (7) gives the following
time allocation choice s∗(t) of the representative agent:
s∗
d=0(t) =
bε
1 + bε
,whatever the value of Ks(t) is;
Therefore, if d = 0, social participation is constant and such that 1 > s∗(t) >
0, whatever the value of Ks(t) is. Notice that social participation s∗(t) in (9)-
(10) is (ceteris paribus) a strictly decreasing function of the parameter d, which
measures the degree of substitutability between B an C. Therefore, it always
holds s∗(t) < s∗
d=0(t).
5.2 Dynamics of social capital accumulation and well-being
analysis
Even if we have considered very simple speciﬁcations of functions F, G and H,
there may exist multiple steady states and poverty traps, as we will see.
The following result concerns the evolution of representative agent’s well-
being along the trajectories under dynamics (8).
Proposition 3 Along the trajectories of (8), the values of the utility function
U and of Ks are positively correlated. This implies that if there exist two steady
states K1
s and K2
s such that K2
s > K1
s, then K2
s Pareto-dominates K1
s; that is
K1
s is a poverty trap.
The following proposition deﬁnes social capital dynamics resulting from the
time allocation choices of the representative agent described in Proposition (1).
Proposition 4 If γ − α > 0, social capital dynamics are given by:
 
Ks =
 
−ηKs  
Kγ−α
s
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s −d(b+1)
 β
 
 
bεKγ−α
s −d(b+1)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s −d(b+1)
 δ
  Kαβ+γδ
s − ηKs
(11)
for, respectively, Ks ≤
 
d(b+1)
bε
  1
γ−α
and Ks >
 
d(b+1)
bε
  1
γ−α
.
If γ − α < 0, they are given by:
 
Ks =
   
K
γ−α
s
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s −d(b+1)
 β
 
 
bεK
γ−α
s −d(b+1)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s −d(b+1)
 δ
  Kαβ+γδ
s − ηKs
−ηKs
(12)
for, respectively, Ks ≤
 
d(b+1)
bε+1
  1
γ−α
and Ks >
 
d(b+1)
bε+1
  1
γ−α
.
14Notice that, if d = 0 (that is C and B are not substitutes), the dynamics of
social capital accumulation become:
 
Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ   Kαβ+γδ
s − ηKs (13)
and the corresponding dynamic regimes are described by the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5 Under the assumption of no substitutability d = 0, the basic
features of dynamics are the following (whatever the sign of the expression γ−α
is):
There always exist two steady states:
Ks =
 
η(1 + bε)β+δ
(bε)δ
  1
αβ+γδ−1
and Ks = 0
If αβ + γδ < 1, then the economy approaches Ks (the steady state Ks = 0
is repulsive) whatever the initial value of Ks > 0 is.
If αβ +γδ > 1, then the steady state Ks is always repulsive while the steady
state Ks = 0 is locally attractive. In particular, if the initial value of Ks is lower
than the threshold value Ks, the economy reaches the steady state Ks = 0; if
it is higher than Ks, the economy follows a trajectory along which the value of
Ks grows indeﬁnitely (that is Ks → +∞). Thus the steady state Ks = 0 is a
poverty trap.
Remark: Note that equation (13) can be written as follows:
 
Ks
Ks
=
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ   Kαβ+γδ−1
s − η
Therefore, if the economy follows a trajectory along which Ks → +∞ and if
αβ+γδ > 1, then along such trajectory the growth rate
 
Ks/Ks is an increasing
function of Ks. The growth rate
 
Ks/Ks is constant only in the limit case
αβ + γδ = 1; in such case it holds:
 
Ks
Ks
=
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ − η
When there is some degree of substitutability between C and B, that is d >
0, dynamics become more complicated and are characterized by the following
Propositions.
Proposition 6 Under the assumption of substitutability d > 0 and if γ−α > 0,
the dynamics are characterized by the following properties:
151. The steady state Ks = 0 is always locally attractive (whatever the value of
the expression αβ + γδ is).
2. If αβ+γδ < 1 then the number of steady states with Ks > 0 is (generically)
zero (see Figure 1) or two (see Figure 2); if two steady states K1
s and K2
s
(K1
s < K2
s) exist, then K2
s is attractive while K1
s is repulsive.
3. If αβ + γδ > 1 then there exists at least a steady state with Ks > 0;
furthermore, the number of steady states with Ks > 0 is one (see Figure
3) or three; if an unique steady state exists, then it is repulsive; if three
steady states K1
s, K2
s and K3
s (K1
s < K2
s < K3
s) exist, then K2
s is attractive
while K1
s and K3
s are repulsive. Finally, if the initial value of Ks is greater
than K∗
s, where K∗
s is the steady state with the highest value of Ks, then
there exists a perpetual endogenous growth path with increasing well-being
along which1 s → bε
1+bε.
Proposition 7 Under the assumption of substitutability (d > 0) and if γ−α <
0, the dynamics are characterized by the following properties:
1. The value of Ks always approaches a steady state value lower than the
upper bound
 
d(b+1)
bε+1
  1
γ−α
(see proposition 4), whatever the value of the
expression αβ +γδ is. Consequently, the stock of social capital Ks cannot
grow indeﬁnitely.
2. If αβ + γδ < 1, then the steady state Ks = 0 is always repulsive; there
exists at least a steady state with with Ks > 0; the number of steady states
with Ks > 0 is (generically) one (see Figure 4) or three (see Figure 5);
steady states with an odd index are attractive and those with an even index
are repulsive. Whatever the initial value of Ks is, the economy approaches
a steady state with Ks > 0.
3. If αβ + γδ > 1, then the steady state Ks = 0 is always locally attractive;
the number of steady states with with Ks > 0 is zero (see Figure 6) or
two; the steady states with an odd index are repulsive and those with an
even index are attractive2.
1Values of simulations in Figure 1: α=0.01, β=0.4, γ=0.82, δ = 1, ε=0.12, η=0.15, b = 4,
d = 0.03; Figure 2:α=0.01, β=0.4, γ=0.82, δ = 1, ε=0.12, η=0.04, b = 4, d = 0.03; Figure
3: α=0.4, β=0.9, γ=0.95, δ = 1, ε=0.7, η=0.3, b = 4, d = 0.3. For α=0.9, β=0.5, δ = 0.85,γ
=0.95, δ = 0.85, ε=0.5, η=0.11, b = 4, d = 0.05 we obtain three positive ﬁxed points of
coordinates K∗
s = 0.005 (repulsive), K∗∗
s = 0.01 (attractive), K∗∗∗
s = 103 (repulsive).
2Values of simulazions in Figure 4: α=0.9, β=0.5, γ=0.4, δ = 1, ε=0.7, η=0.04, b = 4,
d = 0.05; Figure 5: α=0.9, β=0.8, γ=0.4, δ = 1, ε=0.7, η=0.24, b = 4, d = 0.05; Figure 6:
α=0.9, β=0.8, γ=0.7, δ = 1, ε=0.5, η=0.12, b = 4, d = 0.4. For α=0.9, β=0.5, δ = 0.85,γ
=0.95, δ = 0.85, ε=0.5, η=0.11, b = 4, d = 0.05 we obtain three positive ﬁxed points of
coordinates K∗
s = 1.35 (attractive), K∗∗
s = 1.48 (repulsive), K∗∗∗
s = 1.58 (attractive).
16Note that necessary and suﬃcient conditions allowing for endogenous un-
bounded growth of the stock of social capital are:
γ − α > 0
αβ + γδ > 1
When these conditions hold, the poverty trap Ks = 0 is always locally at-
tracting; however, when the initial value of Ks is high enough, the economy
follows a trajectory along which Ks → +∞. As stated above, along such tra-
jectory we have that:
s →
bε
1 + bε
and the equation (11) “tends” (for Ks → +∞) to the equation:
 
Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ   Kαβ+γδ
s − ηKs
which coincides with the equation (13) describing social dynamics under the
assumption d = 0 (no substitutability between C and B). This allows to say
that when the stock of social capital becomes high enough, then the dynamics
under the assumption d = 0 and those under the assumption d > 0 become
“very similar”3.
Figure 1 Figure 2
3Remember that from equation (13) it follows that if αβ + γδ > 1, then the growth rate
 
Ks/Ks is positive and increasing along the trajectories where Ks → +∞. Remember also
that unbounded growth of Ks, with a constant rate of growth
 
Ks/Ks of social capital, can
occur if and only if αβ+γδ = 1; in such case, along the trajectories where Ks → +∞ we have
that
 
Ks/Ks appoaches the value
(bε)δ
(1+bε)β+δ − η.
17Figure 3 Figure 4
Figure 5 Figure 6
6 The eﬀects of (exogenous) technical progress
In this section we study the eﬀects on dynamics generated by the introduction of
exogenous technological progress T(t) in the production function of the private
good:
Y (t) = T(t)   [1 − s(t)]   Kα
s (t) (14)
where the growth rate of T is assumed to be given by the equation:
 
T(t) = σT(t) (15)
where σ is a strictly positive parameter representing the growth rate of T.
In such context, the time allocation choice s∗(t) by the representative agent is
described by the following proposition.
18Proposition 8 If the production function of the private good is given by (14),
then problem (7) admits solution and the time allocation choice s∗(t) of the
representative agent is:
If γ − α > 0
s∗(t) =

 
 
0, if Ks(t) ≤
 
d (b+1) T(t)
bε
  1
γ−α
bεKγ−α
s (t)−d (b+1) T(t)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s (t)−d (b+1) T(t) if Ks(t) >
 
d (b+1) T(t)
bε
  1
γ−α (16)
If γ − α < 0
s∗(t) =

 
 
bεK
γ−α
s (t)−d (b+1) T(t)
(1+bε)K
γ−α
s (t)−d (b+1) T(t), if Ks(t) ≤
 
d (b+1) T(t)
bε+1
  1
γ−α
0, if Ks(t) >
 
d (b+1) T(t)
bε+1
  1
γ−α (17)
6.1 The case without substitutability between C and B
If there is not substitutability between private consumption C and relational
goods B (i.e. if d = 0), social participation is constant and strictly positive
s∗(t) = bε/(1+bε); in such context, the dynamics of social capital are given by
the equation:
 
Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ   TβKαβ+γδ
s − ηKs (18)
where the evolution of T is described by the diﬀerential equation (15). Note
that
 
Ks = 0 for Ks = 0 and along the graph of the function:
Ks =
 
(bε)δ
η(1 + bε)β+δ
  1
1−αβ−γδ
  T
β
1−αβ−γδ (19)
which is increasing (decreasing) in T if αβ+γδ < 1 (respectively, if αβ+γδ >
1). Note that, if αβ + γδ < 1, then it holds
 
Ks < 0 above the curve (19) and
 
Ks > 0 below it; viceversa if αβ + γδ > 1.
The basic features of dynamics under the assumption of no substitutability
are described by the following Proposition.
Proposition 9 Dynamics (18) have the following properties:
1) If αβ+γδ < 1, then both T and Ks grow without bound (i.e. lim
t→+∞T(t) =
+∞ and lim
t→+∞Ks(t) = +∞) along any trajectory starting with a strictly positive
initial value of Ks (see Figure 7). Among these trajectories, there exists a
trajectory represented by the equation:
Ks =
 
(1 − αβ − γδ)(bε)δ
[βσ + η(1 − αβ − γδ)](1 + bε)β+δ
  1
1−αβ−γδ)
  T
β
1−αβ−γδ (20)
19along which the growth rates of T and Ks are given by:
 
Ks
Ks
=
β
(1 − αβ − γδ)
 
T
T
. (21)
where
 
T/T = σ by assumption and
 
Ks
Ks >
 
T
T if and only if
β
1−αβ−γδ > 1.
Along the remaining trajectories, the growth rate of Ks approaches the value
given in (21) as t → +∞.
2) If αβ + γδ > 1, then two dynamic regimes are possible:
2.1) Case: η(αβ + γδ − 1) − βσ < 0. In such case, both T and Ks grow
without bound along any trajectory starting with a strictly positive initial value
of Ks (see Figure 8). Along these trajectories, the growth rate of Ks is always
increasing (without upper bound).
2.2) Case: η(αβ + γδ − 1) − βσ > 0. In such case, in the plane (T,Ks)
there exists a trajectory Γ along which the value of the product Tβ  Kαβ+γδ−1
s is
constant (this implies that lim
t→+∞Ks(t) = 0 along such trajectory). The value of
Ks along the trajectories above Γ behaves as in case 2.1) while lim
t→+∞Ks(t) = 0
along the trajectories below Γ (see Figure 9)4.
Proof. This Proposition can be proved by deﬁning a new variable:
x :=
Tβ
K
1−(αβ+γδ)
s
(22)
and by calculating its time derivative:
 
x =
Tβ
K
1−(αβ+γδ)
s
(β
 
T
T
− (1 − (αβ + γδ))
 
Ks
Ks
) = (23)
= x
 
[βσ + η(1 − αβ − γδ)] −
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ(1 − αβ + γδ)x
 
(24)
Equation (24) has two stationary states:
x∗ = 0 and x∗∗ =
[βσ + η(1 − αβ − γδ)](1 + bε)β+δ
(1 − αβ − γδ)(bε)δ
Notice that, if αβ+γδ < 1, then x∗∗ > 0 is globally attracting in the positive
x-axis; since, by (23),
 
x = 0 if and only if the condition (21) holds, point 1) is
proved.
To prove point 2), note that, if η(αβ + γδ − 1) − βσ > 0, then x∗∗ > 0 is
repelling while x∗ is locally attracting; if η(αβ +γδ−1)−βσ < 0, then x∗∗ < 0
4Values of simulazions in Figure 7: α=0.3, β=0.21, γ=0.2, δ = 0.4, ε=0.4, η=0.02,
σ = 0.4, b = 0.1; Figure 8:α=0.82, β=0.71, γ=0.7, δ = 0.92, ε=0.6, η=0.02, σ = 0.4,
b = 10.1; Figure 9 and Figure 10: α=0.9, β=0.91, γ=0.9, δ = 0.92, ε=0.6, η=0.02,
σ = 0.01, b = 10.1.
20and x∗ is repelling. Therefore, in case 2.1), if the initial value of x, x0, coincides
with the stationary value x∗∗, then the economy follows the trajectory Γ. If
x0 < x∗∗, along the trajectory it holds x = TβKαβ+γδ−1
s → 0 and consequently
Ks → 0, being T → +∞. Note that the trajectories starting with x0 < x∗∗
correspond to the trajectories below Γ, in the plane (T,Ks). If x0 > x∗∗, along
this trajectory (which corresponds to a trajectory above Γ, in the plane (T,Ks))
it holds x = TβKαβ+γδ−1
s → +∞. This implies that Ks → +∞; this is the case
since along all the trajectories crossing the curve (19) it holds Ks → +∞; so, if
there would exist trajectories above Γ along which Ks → 0, then a separatrix
should exist between the two sets of trajectories which, by continuity properties,
should give rise to a further ﬁxed point of dynamics (24), diﬀerent from x∗ and
x∗∗. Point 2.2) can be proved by similar arguments.
Remark: It is interesting to note that:
1. If there is no substitutability between C and B, then Ks can grow without
bond, whatever the sign of the expression γ − α (we will show that this
result no more holds when there is substitutability).
2. Along the trajectories under dynamics (18), the evolution of Ks is monotonic
(always increasing or decreasing) or follows a U-shaped path, according to
which Ks is initially decreasing and then becomes deﬁnitively increasing.
It is worth to stress such result in that, as we will see, if there is substi-
tutability between C and B, then the evolution of Ks can take the shape
of an inverted U curve.
Figure 7 Figure 8
21Figure 9 Figure 10
It is easy to check that, along the trajectories below the separatrix Γ, well-
being may be decreasing; that is, the increase in T may be not able to compen-
sate the reduction in Ks.
6.2 The case with substitutability between C and B
If d > 0, then social participation s∗ depends on the values of T and Ks and
can assume the value 0. In particular, the graph of the function:
Ks =
 
d(b + 1)T
bε
  1
γ−α
(25)
separates, in the plane (T,Ks), the region where s∗ = 0 (below the curve)
from that where s∗ > 0 (above it). Note that the function (25) is increasing
(decreasing) in T if γ − α > 0 (respectively, if γ − α < 0).
In the region where s∗ = 0, social capital dynamics is given by
 
Ks = −ηKs <
0 and the slope of trajectories dKs
dT = −
ηKs
σT is negative; this implies that along
the trajectories below the curve (25), T increases and Ks decreases.
Above the curve (25), social capital dynamics are given by:
 
Ks =
 
Kγ−α
s
(1 + bε)K
γ−α
s − d(b + 1)T
 β
 
 
bεKγ−α
s − d(b + 1)T
(1 + bε)K
γ−α
s − d(b + 1)T
 δ
 TβKαβ+γδ
s −ηKs
(26)
where T evolves according to the diﬀerential equation (15).
The basic features of dynamics (26) are described in the following Proposi-
tion.
Proposition 10 If γ − α > 0, then region under the curve (25) is positively
invariant under dynamics: every trajectory entering such region cannot leave it.
Along the trajectories under the curve (25), the value of Ks approaches 0 for
t → +∞ (see Figure11.).
22If γ−α < 0, then region above (under) the curve (25) is positively invariant
if σ/η(α − γ) ≥ 1 (respectively, if σ/η(α − γ) < 1); in any case, along every
trajectory the value of Ks approaches 0 for t → +∞ (see Figures 12 and 13 5..).
Proof. To check the results on positive invariance of the sets under or
above the curve (25), we have simply to compare the slope of the trajectories
dKs
dT = −
ηKs
σT , evaluated along the curve (25), and the slope of (25). To prove
the results about the evolution of Ks, notice that in the set where s∗ = 0 it
holds dKs
dt = −ηKs and consequently Ks(t) = Ks(0)   e−ηt, where Ks(0) is the
initial value of Ks. Finally, note that, in case γ − α < 0, every trajectory lies
deﬁnitively in the set under the curve (25) or in the set above it; in any case,
since T → +∞, the value of Ks approaches 0.
Whatever the sign of the expression γ −α is, along the trajectories crossing
the curve (25) we will show that the evolution of Ks can take an inverted U-
shape, diﬀerently from the case without substitutability.
According to the above Proposition, a necessary condition to have unbounded
growth of Ks is γ − α > 0; that is, the importance (measured by α) of Ks as
input in the production process of the private good must be lower than its
importance (measured by γ) in the production process of the relational good.
To analyze the behaviour of Ks in case γ−α > 0 we introduce the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 11 A Regular Growth Curve (RGC) is a curve in the plane (T,Ks)
along which the rate of growth of T is equal to the exogenously given value σ
while the rate of growth of Ks is equal to a constant strictly positive value g,
possibly diﬀerent from σ.
Notice that along a RGC, being
 
T
T = σ and
 
Ks
Ks = g, it holds dKs
dT =
 
Ks
 
T
=
gKs
σT ; consequently a RGC is the graph of a function Ks (T) = AT
g
σ,where A is
a positive arbitrary constant. RGCs are not trajectories under our dynamics.
However, we aim to show that there exist values of g and A, that we will denote
by g and A respectively, such that along the trajectories starting “near” to
Ks (T) = AT
g
σ for T high enough. it holds
 
Ks
Ks → g as T → +∞.
Notice that Ks (T) = AT
g
σ must lie above the curve (25), for T high enough;
this require that g must satisfy the necessary condition:
g
σ > 1
γ−α, where 1
γ−α >
1. That is, it must hold g > σ
γ−α (where σ
γ−α > σ). So we introduce a further
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 12 A Reachable Regular Growth Curve (RRGC) is a RGC satis-
fying the condition g > σ
γ−α.
5Values of simulazions in Figure 11: α=0.7, β=0.2, γ=0.2, δ = 0.3, ε=0.4, η=0.06,
σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3, Figure 12: α=0.3, β=0.2, γ=0.71, δ = 0.3, ε=0.4, η=0.06,
σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3;; Figure 13: α=0.82, β=0.71, γ=0.7, δ = 0.92, ε=0.6, η=0.02,
b = 3, d = 0.3.
23This condition requires a relatively low value of α compared with that of γ.
Looking at (16), it is easy to check that, along a RRGC, the social participa-
tion choice s∗ approaches the value bε
(1+bε) as t → +∞. Remember that bε
(1+bε) is
the value of social participation in the context without substitutability. In other
words, if T and Ks grow following a RRGC, then for T and Ks high enough,
social participation is “almost” equal to social participation in the context with-
out substitutability. Now the problem is: do values of g and A exist such that
along the trajectories starting near the associated RRGC it holds
 
Ks
Ks → g as
t → +∞? To solve this problem, we analyze the behaviour of the variable:
x =
Tβ
K
1−αβ−γδ
s
previously deﬁned (see (22)) and limit our analysis to the case 1−αβ−γδ >
0.6. Remember that in the context in which s∗ = bε
(1+bε) always (i.e. in the
context without substitutability), it holds
 
x = 0 (see (23)) along the curve (see
(20)):
Ks = A   T
g
σ
where A :=
 
(1−αβ−γδ)(bε)δ
[βσ+η(1−αβ−γδ)](1+bε)β+δ
  1
1−αβ−γδ
and g :=
β
1−αβ−γδ. So, if
βσ
1−αβ−γδ > σ
γ−α (i.e.
β
1−αβ−γδ(γ − α) > 1), we have that, as T → +∞, along
Ks = A T
g
σ the value of
 
x approaches 0 while
 
x becomes (see (23)) strictly pos-
itive (respectively, strictly negative) along the RRGCs corresponding to values
of g < g (respectively g > g), with g and A near enough to g and C, respectively.
This implies that all trajectories starting (for T high enough) suﬃciently near
to Ks = A   T
g
σ, approach Ks = A   T
g
σ as T → +∞.
Notice that, by Proposition 3, all trajectories in the plane (T,Ks) can be
Pareto-ranked; in particular, we have that given two trajectories   Ks(T) and
  Ks(T), with   Ks(T) <   Ks(T), then   Ks(T) Pareto-dominates   Ks(T). Further-
more, well-being may be decreasing when the economy follows a trajectory along
which Ks → 0 (see Figures7 14, 15, 16).
6In the opposite case it can be shown that, as in case d = 0, along trajectories Ks ap-
proaches 0 or +∞ but, in the latter case,
 
Ks
Ks grows without bound.
7Values of simulazions in Figures 14, 15, 16: α=0.7, β=0.2, γ=0.2, δ = 0.3, ε=0.4,
η=0.01, σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3.
24Figure 11 Figure 12
Figure 13 Figure 14
Figure 15 Figure 16
257 Concluding remarks
Our framework addresses a range of hypotheses that have never been jointly
taken into account within a theoretical model. Agents allocate their time be-
tween labour, aimed at the production of private goods, and social participation
activities. Private consumption and relational goods are substitutable: if the
environment is poor of participation opportunities and social interactions are
perceived as costly and frustrating, people can disengage from relational activ-
ities and devote more time and resources to private consumption. We consider
also the possibility of positive spillovers from private to relational production,
due the ability of job interactions to stimulate the creation of durable ties.
Following hints from the sociological literature, we assume that most of the
times the creation of interpersonal ties does not depend on rational investment
decisions. Rather, it is an incidental, not necessary, by-product of social partic-
ipation. The resulting stock is a public resource, which enters as an argument
in agent’s utility function and as an input in both “material” and “relational”
goods’ production functions. Since human relations need a continuous care to
be preserved over time, we account for a positive depreciation rate of the stock
of social capital. The main results of our study can be summarized as follows.
If social capital is more relevant in the production of relational goods, then
the increase in the productivity of time devoted to social participation is higher
compared to that of time devoted to the production and consumption of private
goods. In such a case, if the stock of social capital is high enough, then the
economy may experience positive levels of social participation. As the golden
rule pointed out in section four explains, if the impact of private goods in the
accumulation of social capital is negligible relative to the role of relational goods,
this conﬁguration of the model’s parameters allows to preserve (and strengthen)
the existing stock of social capital, thereby fostering sustainable growth. The
process is highly path-dependent: in a “favourable” situation, the accumula-
tion of social capital improves the technology of production of relational goods,
which in turn raises social participation, thereby consolidating social ties and
the diﬀusion of trust. Such a virtuous circle leads to a further strengthening of
the stock of social capital.
On the other side, the reverse process may be self-feeding as well: if the
economy experiences private growth and a simultaneous decline in social partic-
ipation and social capital, then the time spent in relational activities becomes
more expensive (in terms of opportunity cost) and less productive (in terms of
relational goods).
As a long-run result, the economy is attracted by multiple steady states,
some of which are social poverty traps, where the stock of social capital is
entirely “destroyed” by private activities.
However, under certain conditions, the possibility exists for the economy
to follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social capital endogenously
and unboundedly grows. The achievement of such result relies on a range of
particular conditions, under which the economy behaves as if there was no
substitutability between relational activities and private consumption. In other
26words, the possibility to ﬁnd the path to sustainable growth depends also on the
rise of a culture acknowledging the relevance of non market relations and foster-
ing the diﬀusion of social (or generalized) trust. The building of such conditions
does not necessarily need centuries, as Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) ar-
gued in the pioneer study. Policy holds a decisive role in promoting cooperative
values and shaping the moral norms of a society. This statement is less smoky
and generic than it may seem, and its discussion requires to address another of
the gaps aﬀecting the social capital literature, namely the relationship between
policy, inequality and the diﬀusion of trust. The concept of equality holds at
least two dimensions: economic equality and the equality of opportunities. Ac-
cording to Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), the lack of both these dimensions
is strongly associated with low trust in the United States8. The experimental
evidence leads to the same results (Glaeser et al., 2000, Barr, 2004).
Introducing exogenous technical progress in the production function of pri-
vate goods leads to interesting modiﬁcations in social capital’s accumulation
dynamics. If there is not substitutability between private and relational goods,
the stock of social capital can grow without bond along any trajectories when
αβ + γδ < 1. If αβ + γδ > 1 , there are alternative trajectories where social
capital grows indeﬁnitely, or tends to zero when its initial stock is particularly
low relative to T. In both the cases, social capital’s trend relative to technical
progress can be monotonic (always increasing or decreasing) or experiences an
initial decline followed by a growth, but not vice versa (a growth followed by a
decline is impossible). Under the assumption of substitutability between private
consumption and relational goods, two cases are possible.
If γ − α < 0, i.e. the contribution of social capital is higher in private
production than in the production of relational goods, then the stock of social
capital always tends to zero whatever are its initial endowments.
In such a case, the stock of social capital experiences a growth followed
by a decline, so that its relationship with technical progress is described by an
inverted U-shaped curve. Since technical progress is in turn positively correlated
with GNP, our result sounds as a proof of Putnam’s (2000) intuition of the
inverted U-shaped relationship between social capital and development.
When γ−α > 0, the rise of technical progress can be accompanied by a pro-
gressive erosion of the entire stock of social capital if its initial endowments are
below a critical threshold. However, if the initial endowments are high enough
in respect to technical progress, there are trajectories where social capital can
grow indeﬁnitely. The possibility of taking trajectories characterized by an un-
bounded growth of social capital thus depends on its initial endowments: an
environment rich of participation opportunities, a culture acknowledging the
importance of non market relations, the diﬀusion of moral norms of reciprocity
and cooperation certainly constitute a good, desirable “starting point”.
8Drawing on GSS data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) ﬁnd that the strongest factors
associated with low trust are (a) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated
against, such as minorities (blacks in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; (b) being
economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; (c) living in a racially mixed
community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity.
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